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Abstract
The stability of a leadership against a growing internal opposition
is studied in bottom-up hierarchical organizations. Using a very simple
model with bottom-up majority rule voting, the dynamics of power
distribution at the various hierarchical levels is calculated within a
probabilistic framework. Given a leadership at the top, the opposi-
tion weight from the hierarchy bottom is shown to fall off quickly while
climbing up the hierarchy. It reaches zero after only a few hierarchical
levels. Indeed the voting process is found to obey a threshold dynam-
ics with a deterministic top outcome. Accordingly the leadership may
stay stable against very large amplitude increases in the opposition
at the bottom level. An opposition can thus grow steadily from few
percent up to seventy seven percent with not one a single change at
the elected top level. However and in contrast, from one election to
another, in the vicinity of the threshold, less than a one percent addi-
tional shift at the bottom level can drive a drastic and brutal change
at the top. The opposition topples the current leadership at once. In
addition to analytical formulas, results from a large scale simulation
are presented. The results may shed a new light on management ar-
chitectures as well as on alert systems. They could also provide some
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different insight on last century’s Eastern European communist col-
lapse.
Keywords: Local majority rules, bottom-up hierarchies, statistical
physics
1 Introduction
Many human systems are organized within pyramidal hierarchies including
large corporations, universities, armies, trade unions or political parties [1].
While many structural organizational frames are possible in practice, two
extreme and opposite cases can be formally singled out as follows. On the
one side stands the dictatorship pyramid initiated at the top of the hierarchy.
Decisions go down towards the base level by level. It is totally directed and
deterministic with a top-down splitting dynamics. On the other side is the
perfectly democratic pyramid built up also level by level, but now from the
bottom upwards to the top. The dynamics is bottom-up aggregating with
the use of local majority rules. In this paper we investigate the second case.
For a review on voting systems see [2].
More precisely we study a generic model, which exemplifies a dynamical
paradox induced by the use of bottom-up majority rules. Considering hier-
archical organizations, local democratic votes are thus shown to produce a
self-neutralization of a growing internal opposition while climbing up the hi-
erarchy from bottom to the top. Within a very simple probabilistic frame we
show how a top leadership can hamper democratically very large amplitude
changes at the hierarchy bottom from a wide support to a huge opposition.
Although we are illustrating the dynamical paradox in terms of voting pro-
cess, the model is quite generic and may apply to many different situations
where bottom-up majority rules aggregation are used. The frame may be a
political group, a firm, a social organization.
Using tools and concepts from statistical physics, the voting process is
found to obey a threshold dynamics with a deterministic top outcome [4,
5, 6]. Accordingly as long as the opposition weight is below some critical
threshold at the bottom, it is found to fall off quickly to reach zero after only
a few hierarchical levels. It thus makes the current leadership very stable.
In some cases, the opposition can grow steadily from few percents up to
2
seventy seven percents with not a single change at the top level. However
and in contrast to such a stability, in the vicinity of the threshold, from one
election to another less than a one percent additional shift at the bottom
level in favor of the opposition can drive a drastic and brutal change at the
top. Seventy percents increase in bottom opposition has no effect on the
elected organization president while less than a one percent change topples
it democratically at once.
In this paper, we consider the situation [3] where members of an organi-
zation may support either one of two policies denoted respectively A and B.
At the bottom, once each member has decided on which policy, A or B it
supports, elections are set via the formation of small groups of people whose
members are chosen randomly. It means that members of a voting group are
not asked about their choice before the voting. Then, each group elects a
representative either A or B according to the majority of its members. All
these elected people constitute the first hierarchical level of the organization.
The voting process is then repeated now from the first level to build the sec-
ond one. At each step up, stands a smaller number of representatives with a
single one at the last level, the president. One illustration of the process is
shown in Figure (1) in the case of groups of size 3.
Accordingly, having an initial support above the critical threshold guar-
antees to win the top level provided there exists some minimum number of
hierarchical levels. The value of the critical threshold to power is a function




in case of groups of even sizes, pcneq
1
2
. This asymmetry arises from the ex-
istence of well kwon inertia of power and status quo [7]. Within our model,
in the case of a local tie in an even size group, it is the former ruler who is
reelected.
For groups of size 4 it makes the threshold to jump at pc = 0.77 for
the opposition. It means that if B is already in power, the opposition A
needs to win more than 0.77% support at the bottom level to reach the top
of the hierarchy. Simultaneously, the threshold to stay in power shrinks to
0.23% to the ruling party. In addition, in cases of even size groups, the
mechanism of self-elimination is even faster than in the case of odd groups.
For instance, a proportion of 0.59% A supporters is self-eliminated within
4 levels. Moreover, the number of levels to reach a deterministic outcome
decreases with increasing the size group.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present
the main frame of the voting model in the case of 3-person groups. A critical
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Figure 1: A two-level bottom-up hierarchy with groups of size 3
4
threshold to deterministic power at the top is found at 50% of initial support
at the bottom level. The self-elimination of the minority occurs within only
a few voting levels. Section 3 introduces some natural bias in the voting rule
with a tip to the ruling party in terms of inertia of power. Illustrated in
the case of even 4-person groups it yields an election in favor of the ruling
party in case of a local tie 2A-2B. Such a bias is found to shift the value
of the critical threshold to power from 50% to 77% for the opposition. In
parallel, it shrinks it from 50% to 23% for the ruling party. Group size effects
are then analyzed in Section 4. Analytic formulas are derived in Section 5.
Given an A initial support p0, the number of voting levels necessary to their
self-elimination is calculated. The results are then turned in a more practical
perspective for hierarchical organizations in Section 6. Some visualization of
a numerical simulation [8] is shown in Section 7 Extension to 3 competing
group is sketched in Section 8. The last section discusses possible applications
of our generic model to describe in part, the historical last century collapse
of Eastern European communist parties. The results may also shed a new
light on management architectures as well as on alert systems.
2 The simple case of groups of size 3
We consider the simplest case with a population divided between individuals
supporting either one of two policies A and B. The respective proportions
at the organization bottom denoted level-0 are respectively p0 and 1 − p0.
Each member does have an opinion. Neither strategy nor interactions are
explicitly included. It means that we do not address the question of why
policy A has a support p0 at the bottom. People do not neither choose their
respective voting group to optimize their weight since the groups are formed
randomly at each level of the hierarchy.
It is worth to stress that although we are illustrating the model in terms of
voting process, it is quite generic and may apply to many different situations
where bottom-up majority rules aggregation are used. The frame may be a
political group, a firm, a social organization.
We start studying the case of groups built of 3 persons randomly selected
from the population. It could correspond to home localization or working
place. Each group then elects a representative using a local majority rule.
Groups with either 3 A or 2 A elect an A. Otherwise it is a B who is elected.
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Therefore the probability to have an A elected from the bottom level is,
p1 ≡ P3(p0) = p30 + 3p20(1− p0) , (1)
where P3(pn) denotes the voting function, here a simple majority rule.
The same process of group forming is repeated within level-1. The elected
persons (from level-0) form groups which in turn elect new higher represen-
tatives. The new elected persons constitute level-2. The process can then
be repeated again and again. The probability to have an A elected at level
(n+1) from level-n is,
pn+1 ≡ P3(pn) = p3n + 3p2n(1− pn) , (2)
where pn is the proportion of A at level-n.
The analysis of the voting function P3(pn) exhibits the existence of 3 fixed
points pl = 0, pc,3 =
1
2
and pL = 1. The first one corresponds to not one
A elected. The last one pL = 1 represents the totalitarian situation where
only A are elected. Both pl and pL are stable fixed points. In contrast pc,3 is
unstable. It determines indeed the threshold for flowing towards either full
power (with pL) or to total disappearance (with pl). Starting from p0 <
1
2
leads to the first case while p0 >
1
2
yields the second. See Figure (2).
On this basis we see that majority rule voting produces the self-elimination




However this democratic self-elimination requires a sufficient number of vot-
ing levels to be completed.
At this stage the instrumental question is to determine the number of
levels required to ensure full leadership to the initial larger party. To make
sense the level number must be small enough, most organizations having only
a few levels (less than 10).
To illustrate the voting dynamics above, let us calculate the representativ-
ity flow starting, for instance, from p0 = 0.45. We get successively p1 = 0.42,
p2 = 0.39, p3 = 0.34, p4 = 0.26, p5 = 0.17, p6 = 0.08 down to p7 = 0.02 and
p8 = 0.00. Within 8 levels 45% of the population is self-eliminated.
Nevertheless the overall process preserves the democratic character of
majority rule voting. It is the bottom leading party (more than 50%) which
eventually gets for sure the full leadership of the organization top level. It is
worth to notice the symmetry of situation with respect to A and B parties.
The threshold to full power is the same (50%) for both of them.
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pA at level (n+1)
pA at level n
Size 3
Size 11
Figure 2: Variation of pn+1 as function of pn for groups of respective sizes 3
and 11 with both pc,3 =
1
2
. Arrows show the direction of the flow.
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3 The tip to be in power: groups of size 4
From the above analysis, to turn down a top leadership requires to have more
than 50% at the bottom which is a fair constraint. However from real life
situations, to produce a change of leadership is much more difficult. A simple
majority appears often not to be enough.
Many institutions are indeed build to strengthen some stability. Frequent
political changes are not perceived as good for the organization. On this
basis, a tip is often given to the ruling party. To be in charge, gives some
additional power which breaks the symmetry between the two parties. For
instance, giving one additional vote to the committee president or allowing
the president do designate some committee members.
Using the democratic statement ”to change things, you need a majority”
produces indeed a strong bias in favor of current rulers. To exemplify it, we
consider even size groups. Again restricting to the simplest case, it means
4 people groups. Assuming the B are the ruling party, the A need either 4
or 3 A in a given group to take over. The tie case 2A-2B votes for a B (see
Figure (3)).
In going from 3 to 4 person size groups, the salient new feature is indeed
the existence of 2A-2B configurations for which there exists no majority. In
most social situations no decision implies de facto, no change. There exists a
bias in favor of the rulers which now makes the voting function asymmetric.
The probability to get an A elected at level n + 1 is,
pn+1 ≡ P4(pn) = p4n + 4p3n(1− pn) , (3)
where pn is as before the proportion of A elected persons at level-n. In
contrast, for a B to be elected the probability is,
1− P4(pn) = p4n + 4p3n(1− pn) + 2p2n(1− pn)2 , (4)
where the last term embodies the bias in favor of B. From Eqs (3) and (4)








for the A. It makes the A threshold to power at about 77% as shown in
Figure (4). Simultaneously the B threshold to stay in power is about 23%
making both situations drastically different. Now, to take over power, the A
8
Figure 3: A two-level bottom-up hierarchy with groups of size 4. A tie goes
to the light color
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need to go over 77% of initial bottom support while to stick to power the B
only need to keep their support above 23%.
In addition to the asymmetry the bias makes the number of levels to
democratic self-elimination even smaller than in the precedent case (3-group
size). Starting again from p0 = 0.45 we now get p1 = 0.24, p2 = 0.05 and
p3 = 0.00. Instead of 8 levels, 3 are enough to make the A disappear.
To illustrate how strong this effect is, let us start far above 50% with
for instance p0 = 0.70. The associated voting dynamics becomes p1 = 0.66,
p2 = 0.57, p3 = 0.42, p4 = 0.20, p5 = 0.03, and p6 = 0.00. Within only 6
levels, 70% of a population is thus self-eliminated.
Using an a priori reasonable bias in favor of the B turns a majority rule
democratic voting to a dictatorship outcome. To get to power the A must
pass over 77% of overall support which is almost out of reach in any normal
democratic two party situation.
4 Larger size groups
Up to now we have considered very small groups. But many organizations
have larger groups. Extending the above cases to groups of any size r is
indeed straightforward with the Equations getting a bit more complicated.
However the main features remain unchanged under size changes.
For a r-size group the voting function pn+1 = Pr(pn) which accounts for









where m = r+1
2
for odd r and m = r+1
2
for even r which thus accounts for the
bias in favor of B.
The two stable fixed points pl = 0 and pL = 1 are unchanged. They are
size independent. In the case of odd sizes, the unstable fixed point is also
unchanged with pc,r =
1
2
. On the opposite, for even sizes, the asymmetry
between the threshold values for respectively rulers and non rulers weakens





for size 4 and
it decreases asymptotically towards pc,r =
1
2
for r→ ∞. It is 65% for size 6,
and stays always larger than 1
2
making hard yet to pass the barrier for the
opponents. It is known that in democratic countries a few percent difference
between two candidates is seen as huge.
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≈ 0.77. Arrows show the direction of the flow.
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In parallel increasing group sizes reduces the number of levels necessary
to get to the stable fixed points as shown in Figure (5). For any application
to real social structure, combinations of different sizes should be considered
since it is not the same organization which prevails at each level. It is left
for future work.
5 Calculating the critical number of hierar-
chical levels
Given an initial support p0 , we want to calculate pn the corresponding value
for A support after n voting levels as a function of p0. Accordingly we expand
the voting function pn = Pr(pn−1) around the unstable fixed point pc,r,
pn ≈ pc,r + (pn−1 − pc,r)kr , (7)
where kr ≡ dPr(pn)dpn |pc,r with Pr(pc,r) = pc,r. Rewriting the last Equation as
pn − pc,r ≈ (pn−1 − pc,r)kr , (8)
we can then iterate the process to get,
pn − pc,r ≈ (p0 − pc,r)knr , (9)
from which we get,
pn ≈ pc,r + (p0 − pc,r)knr . (10)
From Eq. (10) two different critical numbers of levels nlc and n
L
c can be
obtained. the first one corresponds to pnlc = 0 and the second one to pnLc = 1.






pc,r − p0 , (11)
which is defined only for p0 < pc,r showing that only below pc,r can the
proportion decrease to zero. On the other hand putting pn = pnLc = 1 in the






pc,r − p0 , (12)
which is now defined only for p0 > pc,r since pc,r < 1, showing that only
above pc,r can the proportion increase to one.
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Proportion of A supporter







Figure 5: Variation of pn as function of the number of levels for a large variety
of groups sizes. All cases have an initial proportion of 70% support for A.
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Though above expansions are a priori valid only in the vicinity of pc,r,
they turn out to be rather good estimates even in getting close to the two
stable fixed points 0 and 1. While taking the integer part of Eqs. (11) and
(12) the rounding is always to the larger value.
6 Inversing the problem
However once organizations are set, they are usually not modified. Therefore
within a given organization the number of hierarchical levels is a fixed quan-
tity. Along this line, to make a practical use of above analysis the question
of “How many level are needed to eliminate a party?” must be turned to,
’‘Given n levels what is the minimum overall support
to get full power for sure?”.
Or alternatively, for the ruling group,
’‘Given n levels what is the critical overall support of the competing party
below which it always self-eliminates totally?”,
which means no worry for the ruling party about its current policy.
To implement this operative question, we rewrite Eq. (10) as,
p0 = pc,r + (pn − pc,r)k−nr . (13)
It yields two critical thresholds. First one is the disappearance threshold pnl,r
which gives the value of support under which the A disappear for sure at the
top level of the n-level hierarchy. It is given by Eq. (13) with pn = 0,
pnl,r = pc,r(1− k−nr ) . (14)
In parallel pn = 1 gives the second threshold p
n
L,r above which the A get full






There exists now a new regime for pnl,r < p0 < p
n
L,r. In there, A neither
disappears totally nor gets to full power.
It is a coexistence region where some democracy is prevailing since results
of the election process are only probabilistic. No party is sure of winning
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making alternate leadership a reality. However as seen from Eq. (15), this
democratic region shrinks as a power law k−nr of the number n of hierarchical
levels. A small number of levels puts higher the threshold to a total reversal
of power but simultaneously lowers the threshold for non-existence.
Above formulas are approximates since we have neglected corrections in
the vicinity of the stable fixed points. However we found they give the right
quantitative values by adding 1 to pnl,r and 2 to p
n
L,r [3].
To get a practical feeling of what Eqs. (14) and (15) mean, let us illustrate





. Considering 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
level organizations, pnl,r is equal to respectively 0.59, 0.66, 0.70, 0.73 and 0.74.
In parallel pnL,r equals 0.82, 0.80, 0.79, 0.78 and 0.78. These series emphasize
drastically the totalitarian character of the voting process.
7 Results from a simulation: visualizing the
dynamics
To exhibit the strength of the phenomena, we show some snapshots of a nu-
merical simulation [8]. The two A and B parties are represented respectively
in white and black squares, with the bias in favor of the black ones, i. e., a tie
2-2 votes for a black square. A structure with 8 levels is shown. We can see
on each picture, how a huge white square majority is self-eliminated. Written
percentages are for the white representation at each level. The “Time” and
“Generations” indicators should be discarded.
Figure (6) shows a case where 52.17% of the people at the bottom are
in support of the B (white), thus a bit over the expected 50% democratic
threshold to take over. However, 3 levels higher in the hierarchy no white
squares appear. The bottom majority has self-evaporated. Figure (7) shows
the same population with now a substantial increase in B(white) support with
a proportion of 68.62%, now rather far than 50%. And yet, after 4 levels no
more white (B) square is found. Figure (8) shows the situation where the B
(white) support has climbed up to the huge value of 76.07%. But again 6
levels higher a A (black) is elected with certainty though its bottom support
is as low as support (black) 23.03%. Finally Figure (9) shows an additional
O.08% very weak increase in B (white) support, putting the actual support
at 77.05%, which in turn prompts an elected B (white) president.
Some insight about the often observed blindness of leaderships towards
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huge and drastic calls for changement from the botton level of an organization
can be gained from the simulation. Indeed it shows how and why a president
who would get some information about the possible disagreement with a
policy cannot account for it since it has to check it from what reaches it from
the bottom of the hierarchy. As seen from Figure (7) while the opposition
is at already at a pick of 68.62% the president gets 100% of totally satisfied
votes from the two levels below it and overwhelming satisfied in the two more
lower levels, so why should it make any policy change ?
8 The case of 3 competing groups
Up to now we have treated very simple cases to single out some main trends
produced by democratic voting while repeated over several hierarchical levels.
In particular the existence of critical thresholds was found to be instrumental
in predicting the voting outcome. Moreover these thresholds are not neces-
sarily symmetric with respect to both competing parties. In the 4-group case
it can be 0.77% for the opposition and 0.23% for the rulers. Such asymmetries
are indeed always present one way or another.
In addition, most real situations involve more than two competing groups.
Let us consider for instance the case of three competing groups A, B and C.
Assuming a 3-group case, the ABC configuration is now unsolved since it
has no majority the same way as in the case of the two party configuration
AABB with groups of size 4. For the AABB case we made the bias in favor
of the ruling group. For multi-group competition typically the bias is decided
in each configuration and from the various parties agreement.
Usually the two largest parties, say A and B are hostile to each other,
while the smallest one C would compromise with either one of them. Along
this line, the ABC configuration elects a C in a coalition with either A or B.
In such a case, we need 2A or 2B to elect respectively an A or a B. Otherwise
a C is elected.
Therefore the elective functions for A and B are the same as for the A
in the two party 3-group model. It means that the critical threshold to full
power to A and B is 50%. In other words for initial support to both A and B,
less than 50% the C get full power. The required number of levels is obtained
from the 3-group formula (Equations (11) and (13) with r = 3).
Let us illustrate what happens for initial support, for instance of 39% for
both A and B. The C are thus left with 22%. We will have the series for
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Figure 6: A 8 level hierarchy for even groups of 4 persons. The two A and
B parties are represented respectively in white and black with the bias in
favor of the black squares, i. e., a tie 2-2 votes for a black square. Written
percentages are for the white representation at each level. The “Time” and
“Generations” indicators should be discarded. The initial white support is
52.17%.
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Figure 7: The same as Figure 6 with an initial white support of 68.62%. The
presidency stays black.
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Figure 8: The same as Figure 6 with an initial white support of 76.07%. The
presidency stays black.
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Figure 9: The same as Figure 6 with an initial white support of 77.05%. The
presidency finally turned white.
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respectively A, B and C: 34%, 34%, 32% at the first level; 26%, 26%, 48%
at the second level; 17%, 17%, 66% at the third level; 8%, 8%, 84% at the
forth level; 2%, 02%, 96% at the fifth level; and 0%, 0%, 100% at the sixth
level giving total power to the C minority within only 6 levels.
It is possible to generalize the present approach to as many parties as
wanted. The analysis becomes much more heavy but the mean features of
voting flows towards fixed point are preserved. Moreover power will go even
more rarely to the largest groups as seen with the above ABC case [9].
9 Conclusion
To conclude we emphasize on the very generic character of our model which
allows to consider many different applications. One could be related to last
century’s auto-collapse of eastern european communist parties. Up to this
historical and drastic event, communist parties seemed eternal. Once they
collapsed many explanations were based on some hierarchical opportunistic
change within the various organizations, with in addition for the non russian
ones, the end of the soviet army threat. Maybe our hierachical model can
provide some different new insight at such a unique event.
Communist organizations are indeed based, at least in principle, on the
concept of democratic centralism which is a tree-like hierarchy. Suppose that
the critical threshold to power was of the order of 77% like in our size 4
case. We could then consider that the internal opposition to the orthodox
leadership did grow a lot and massively over several decades to eventually
reach and pass the critical threshold. Once the threshold was passed, then
we had the associated sudden rise to the leadership levels of the internal
opposition. Therefore, what looked at a sudden and punctual collapse of
Eastern European communist parties could have been indeed the result of
a very long and solid phenomenon inside the communist parties. Such an
explanation does not oppose to the very many additional features which
were instrumental in these collapses. It only singles out some trend within
the internal mechanism of these organizations which makes them extremely
stable.
The results may also shed a new light on management architectures as
well as on alert systems. However in order to avoid any confusion between
political issues and the management of firms and organizations, it should
be noticed that if there exist some similarities between a government as an
21
organization while some constraints are inevitable in management itself, both
realities are quite different in nature and objectives.
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